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Abstract
This first chapter uses neighborhood vacancies as a proxy for foreclosures and
examines their impact on the value of surrounding neighborhood properties.
Often, the negative spillover of a foreclosure results from decay of the foreclosed
property. Existence of a foreclosure within a neighborhood is proxied for by a vacant
structure within 300 feet of the observed unit, resulting in a lower bound foreclosure
externality.
Using the special neighbor sample of the American Housing Sample waves
1985, 1989 and 1993, small neighborhoods are observed and categorized into racially
different neighborhoods (black, integrated or white neighborhood). Additionally,
neighborhood-specific averages are constructed, such as mean income, crime and
other characteristics. Estimating an hedonic housing price model, this study finds
a decrease of about 15 percent for houses located within close proximity to a vacant
structure. The effect is even bigger, approximately 18.5 percent, if a house is located
near a vacant house in a black neighborhood vs. a white neighborhood.
These results suggest that a negative foreclosure effect exists, but that it differs
in magnitude depending on the type of neighborhood as well as the general location
of the neighborhood (i.e., city center, urban or rural).
The second chapter investigates the impact of a municipality’s financial condi-
tion on the housing values within a municipality. The data consist of 68,882 housing
ii
units located in 175 cities through 115 MSAs across 42 states. Information on the
housing units’ and owner’s characteristics are drawn from the 2011 IPUMS and sup-
plemented with MSA-level economic condition variables. The municipal financial
information is drawn from the 2010 government census and consists of very detailed
information of every local government’s finances. The empirical results provide evi-
dence that the financial state of a municipality affects local housing values.
iii
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Chapter 1
“... but it was a Small eyesore”:
The Effects of Foreclosures on
Neighborhood Housing Values
1. Introduction
Housing is a vital part of an economy, providing shelter for people, as well as an
investment opportunity. Additionally, housing is the largest component of privately
held wealth for the majority of Americans (Wolff, 2012), making it an important
subject of research. The recent housing crash in 2007, with nation-wide high foreclo-
sure rates and the resulting impact on individuals, communities and the country as a
whole, has been the focus of the newest wave of research concerning housing. While
housing prices have risen steadily over 60 years at an average rate of 15 percent per
year since the first housing census in 1940 (United States Census Bureau, 2012), the
dramatic increase in housing values between 1999–2006 has been unprecedented. One
of the factors affecting the housing trend was The Community Reinvestment Act of
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1977, which was designed to help individuals gain access to credit from depository
institutions within their community (Federal Reserve, 2014), and was particularly
aimed at low and moderate income people, who were considered higher risk and
therefore unable to get credit prior. Another factor was the record low federal funds
rate, following the 2001 recession, which made credit cheap. The combination of these
factors, as well as other developments in the credit market did not only make credit
available and affordable for a large fraction of the population, but also allowed for
riskier borrowers to receive a mortgage, increasing demand for homeownership. In
fact, homeownership rates rose consistently from 62.9 percent in 1965 until peaking at
69.1 percent in late 2005, followed by a decline in homeownership rates to 65 percent
by 2013 (United States Census Bureau).
The general increase in prices and the easily available credit attracted investors
who were hoping to make a quick buck by buying property today with the intention
of reselling it in the near future at an expected higher price, hence making a profit.
The additional demand for housing properties led to an unsustainable increase in
housing prices and the formation of the housing market bubble. In 2006 housing
prices peaked in most major metropolitan areas, according to Standard & Poor’s
Case-Shiller Index, at a level on average of more than 135 percent higher than before
prices started to increase in 1999 (Standard and Poor’s Dow Jones Indices, 2013).1
By 2007 the so-called housing market bubble burst and the market experienced a
dramatic downfall, with prices decreasing rapidly.
While the economy as a whole is slowly recovering since the recession in 2008,
the housing market is not recuperating as quickly. As of March 2013, homeowner-
ship rates are still 4 percent lower than in 2005 and housing prices are only slowly
1The Case-Shiller Index is the leading house price index in the US housing market. Reporting
changes in the residential real estate market in 20 metropolitan areas and across country (Standard
and Poor’s Dow Jones Indices, 2013)
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recovering, having increased only 8–10 percent since hitting bottom in March 2012
(Blitzer, 2013). The downfall, combined with the slow recovery, means that many
mortgage holders were, and some still are, in the unfavorable position of owing more
than the current value of their homes. The recent US housing market downturn, fol-
lowing the 2007–2008 subprime mortgage crisis, is characterized by a particular large
percentage of mortgage holders defaulting on their debt obligation, resulting in peo-
ple living in houses that no longer belong to them, which decreases the incentive to
maintain the home during this time and which they have to vacate in the end.2 From
2008 through 2009 the industry experienced an all-time high in foreclosure rates. Al-
though, there has been a decrease in foreclosure rates since then, the overall impact
has been tremendous. As of April 2014, there have been an approximated 4.9 mil-
lion completed foreclosures since September 2008 (National Mortgage Professional).
Furthermore, housing vacancies reached a high in 2010 of 2.5 percent for single-unit
structures and 9.2 percent for multi-unit structures (Standard and Poor’s Dow Jones
Indices, 2013). The values of properties in foreclosure likely decrease as time passes
without the house being occupied and maintained; in addition, over time there may
also be impacts on nearby properties due to a lack of upkeep on foreclosed and vacant
properties.
This paper studies vacancies, many of which may be the result of foreclosures,
and examines whether there is a negative effect on nearby property values due to the
existence of foreclosed properties, that have reached the end-stage of foreclosure - va-
cancy, and if this effect differs depending on the type of neighborhood the foreclosure
is in. Neighborhoods are categorized into three different types, determined by the
race of the neighborhood occupants, in order to investigate whether the foreclosure
2People holding mortgages, making monthly payments technically do not own their homes either,
but the mortgage issuer does. Generally speaking, as long as a borrower is in good standings with
his creditors, making all necessary payments he is considered the homeowner.
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effect differs based on neighborhood type. This study finds that there is, indeed,
a negative effect of having a foreclosed property within close proximity; on average
it decreases one’s housing value by an estimated 15 percent. Also, neighborhoods in
densely-populated areas, such as central-city, with properties in distress might experi-
ence less of a negative impact than properties in less populated areas if the proximity
effect is offset by other factors. Intuitively this may be a result of differences in de-
mand elasticities due to location. Using a proxy variable for distance it can be shown
that the absolute value of the impact decreases if a vacancy does not occur close to
one’s own property. This spatial difference is a consistent finding within the housing
literature. Additionally, having an abandoned structure close by when living in a
black neighborhood decreases the housing value by 18.5 percent relative to the same
house in a white neighborhood. The increase in magnitude, due to the neighborhood
being ‘black’, is an interesting finding, that is consistent with the racial discrimina-
tion in housing literature, suggesting a potential need for government programs that
specifically target minority neighborhoods.
Section 2 takes a look at the foreclosure literature, followed by the data ex-
planation in Section 3. The model is developed in Section 4 and the estimation with
results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Literature
There is a growing literature on foreclosure externalities due to the bursting
of the recent housing market bubble. However, the models that have been used
vary widely and, for the most part, have not been particularly rich. Earlier studies
looked at a potential discount in the foreclosed properties themselves. Schilling et
al. (1990) investigate sales of foreclosed condominiums in 1985 in Baton Rouge,
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Louisiana. They estimate a 24 percent discount on such properties. The main issue
with this study is that the authors solely look at condominium characteristics and do
not control for location, quality or other conditions. The estimates are likely biased
if systematic differences exist between foreclosed and ordinary properties, and could
easily reflect other effects such as maintenance. More recently Campbell et al. (2011)
estimate an hedonic pricing model. Looking at foreclosed single family-properties in
Massachusetts between 1987 and 2007, the authors find a 22 percent discount rate on
sales of properties in distress.
In general, there are multiple plausible explanations for spillover effects of fore-
closures on nearby property values. One such explanation is that properties in distress
tend to depreciate more than properties that are not in foreclosure, since the occu-
pants of properties in foreclosure may stop maintaining the property. Maintenance
is a form of investment, and homeowners who expect that they will never see any
return on this investment have little incentive to maintain their home. This could
potentially lower the values of surrounding properties in two ways: directly, if the
presence of foreclosures pushes down surrounding prices, or indirectly if the condition
of the foreclosed property lowers the marginal return to investment on neighboring
properties. The second effect can lead to an overall decrease in neighborhood quality
as other homeowners invest less in their own properties. Ioannides (2002) finds that
the maintenance behavior of individuals is influenced by the maintenance behavior
of their immediate neighbors. He uses the AHS special neighborhood sample from
1985, 1989 and 1993, which allows him to look at social interactions of residents at
the neighborhood level.
The problem with neighborhood occupants decreasing their maintenance is
that housing is immobile. Even if one would like to live in a well maintained neigh-
borhood, one’s home cannot simply be moved to a new location upon observation
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of a general decrease in neighborhood quality. Therefore the choice of a unit to live
in does not just depend on the characteristics of the unit itself— e.g., apartment vs.
house, size, quality, or presence of outdoor space, such as a yard, porch or balcony—
but also in large part on the location. Individuals’ choices are generally highly depen-
dent on their employment location and commuting preference. Since people spend
a large portion of their leisure time within their community, neighborhood charac-
teristics have a significant impact on the value of housing units. Sociologists and
psychologists argue that neighborhoods play an important role in the well-being of
individuals and society as a whole. In recent years, many local governments have
placed an increasing emphasis on the development, maintenance and improvement
of residential neighborhoods. Consequently, some neighborhoods are more desirable
to live in than others. It has been shown that there exists a different house price
gradient, meaning that housing units with the same characteristics will be valued
differently depending on the type of neighborhood they are in, depending on neigh-
borhood type as investigated by Myers (2004). She investigates racial discrimination
in the housing market, differentiating between neighborhoods on the basis of racial
composition. Given Myers’ findings, it is possible that foreclosure effects could differ
across neighborhoods.
Immergluck and Smith (2005) focus on foreclosures in Chicago from 1997–
1998, using data on 9,600 single-family property transactions in 1999. They find that
foreclosures have a significant impact on nearby property value (within one-eighth
of a mile) resulting in a 0.9 percent decrease in value. This effect is even bigger in
low-income neighborhoods, where a foreclosure decreases the value of surrounding
properties by 1.8 percent per foreclosure. The authors also have data on type of
mortgage, (i.e., government insured mortgages or conventional loan) which allow them
to suggest that the effect is only significant for non-government insured mortgages.
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Lin et al. (2009) develop a theoretical pricing model, which they test by
using property sales in 2003 and 2006. The authors create a unique data set by
randomly drawing from a nationwide data set of mortgages issued between 1990 and
2006. From that sample they choose the Chicago PMSA as their study area. Using
an hedonic pricing model, controlling for neighborhood location and demographics,
they regress housing sales price on house-specific characteristics, county and zip code
dummies, quarter dummies and the number of foreclosures within a given surrounding
area. They find that the spillover effect from foreclosure properties is significant, but
decreases substantially with increasing distance from the property in distress and
over time. The negative impact on neighboring property values ranges from −1.2
percent to −8.7 percent. The authors note that this is an upper bound and argue
that while it is reasonable to assume that similar markets, such as Dallas, Atlanta
and Detroit, might show similar results, other regions may experience smaller impacts
from foreclosures.
Li and Morrow-Jones (2010) focus on the impact of neighborhood foreclosures
on socioeconomic conditions of a household. Due to foreclosures, homeowners have to
leave their properties and that, over time, can change the demographic composition
of a neighborhood. The authors use foreclosure sales data from Cuyahoga County,
Ohio between 1983–1989, and look at neighborhood changes from 1990–2000 in order
to observe long-term effects of foreclosures. Using seemingly unrelated regressions,
where the dependent variables are the neighborhood indicators that change over time
(e.g., number of black occupants, female household heads, etc.), the authors find a
positive relationship between foreclosure rates and changes in percentage of black
population, female head-of-household, median household income and unemployment
rate.
Little research on foreclosure externalities has been done using data from the
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most recent housing crisis. Among the few are Rogers and Winter (2009), which
looks at single-family housing sales and foreclosures from 1998–2007 in St. Louis
County, Missouri. Accounting for spatial dependency, the authors estimate an hedonic
pricing model where the log sales price is regressed on two sets of variables. The first
includes timing of sale, house specific characteristics, and spatial characteristics, while
the second set accounts for the marginal impact of foreclosures in a neighborhood
by adding up all foreclosed properties within a specified spatio-temporal ring. The
authors find a temporal and spatial decline in sales prices of neighboring properties.
However, the presences of many foreclosures do not appear to magnify this effect,
suggesting that the marginal overall effect is much smaller than previously thought.
In contrast to similar papers, the authors do not have many neighborhood control
variables, thus this data limitation might cause attenuation bias and understate the
true effect of foreclosures.
Schuetz et al. (2008) inspect foreclosures and residential property sales from
2000–2005 in New York City. The authors use a conventional hedonic pricing model
controlling for property and neighborhood characteristics as well as distance and time
from property in distress. In accordance with other studies, they find there exists a
negative effect of foreclosures on sales prices. In contrast to other studies, they find
that this effect is increasing in distance and time. This could be a result of omitted
variable bias. Property values in an urban setting, such as New York City, are usually
correlated with distance to transportation such as the subway system and bus line,
yet this study does not control for this. Similarly, Kobie and Lee (2011) use a spatial
hedonic model and also find an increase in negative spillover from foreclosures. This
research finds that this effect increases as time passes. The result suggests that
government intervention designed to prevent or lessen the negative externality of
foreclosure would need to occur in the early stages of a crisis.
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One of the biggest impacts of foreclosed houses in neighborhoods comes from
vacant or abandoned properties since, in addition to not being maintained, these can
become havens for crime and drugs. One of the unique features of the last housing
market crisis was a large number of vacant foreclosed properties. Immergluck (2010)
uses nation-wide data on mortgages to look at the change of real estate owned (REO)
property stock, by area, which is defined by the zip-code level, from 2006–2008.3
Immergluck finds that, contrary to common beliefs, a bigger increase in REOs is found
in central cities as opposed to suburban areas. In addition, being located in an area
that experiences a huge boom versus one with more modest house price appreciation
has a bigger impact on the REO increase. Immergluck’s results also suggest that
regardless of the geographical location, newly developed neighborhoods experience a
larger default on foreclosures than established neighborhoods. The study concludes
that there is a need for mortgage regulation, in terms of loan-level default risk, and
monitoring of the spatial distribution of high-risk loans to prevent an over-localization
of high-risk loans.
3. Data
The American Housing Survey (AHS) provides data on the U.S. housing mar-
ket, housing unit characteristics and demographic characteristics enabling policy an-
alysts, congressional staff and others to observe supply and demand of housing and
suggest housing policies.4 Although the survey is conducted by the U.S. Census bu-
reau, it is designed and maintained by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), a government agency responsible for housing programs includ-
3REO - a class of properties that are owned by a bank, government agencies or other type of
lender, after a completed foreclosure before it is being sold.
4Until 1981 the survey was conducted annually and therefore known as the annual housing survey.
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ing neighborhood stabilization and affordable living programs.
The survey started in 1973 with a random draw of 60,000 housing units from
the nation-wide housing stock. Since a redesign in 1985 the survey is conducted ev-
ery two years and includes a base of approximately 47,000 units. The sample follows
housing units, instead of occupants, and each unit stays in the sample until the survey
undergoes a re-design, when a completely new sample is drawn.5 The next re-design
is scheduled for 2015.6 Unfortunately, due to confidentiality restrictions, one can-
not determine a unit’s geographical location beyond the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA).7 From a research point of view, being able to establish a closer-knit neighbor-
hood is important, given that people do not choose the neighborhood they live in at
random, but put a substantial amount of time into searching for a location that suits
their personal preference and is affordable. Hence, one can argue that the immediate
neighborhood (e.g. the street one lives on) might have a considerable impact on the
housing unit’s value. Most studies, controlling for neighborhood characteristics, use
zip-code or census tract identifiers to construct neighborhood variables. These neigh-
borhoods can consist of up to 8,000 units, a measure substantially larger than what
might reasonably be considered a neighborhood. Also, the distance to the central
business district (CBD) and city center likely affects the housing values. Again, due
to confidentiality protection of survey participants, location variables allowing the
measurement of distance are usually not available. However, clustering housing units
into small neighborhoods controls for location differences, since the distance to the
5A re-design generally includes some changes to the survey questionnaire and the way the survey
is conducted, i.e. personal home visits vs. phone interviews or changing from paper questionnaires
to electronically recording the interviewee’s answers.
6A more detailed explanation of the sample design is provided by HUD and can be found at
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/ahs/ahs_codebook.html
7Theoretically, more detailed location identifiers (e.g. census tracts) exist. However, it is a
lengthy process to gain permission to these data. The U.S. Census Bureau grants access to census
tract data, which can be linked with the housing data only under special circumstances and a rather
extensive application process.
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CBD is approximately the same for each unit within a neighborhood.
In 1985, 680 “kernel” units from the national sample were chosen at random
and these became the core of a special neighbor sub-sample. Each of these 680 units’
ten closest neighbors were identified and, when possible, interviewed. Together, the
kernel unit and neighboring units comprise a “cluster”. The cluster neighbors had to
be within a mile of the kernel unit and were not allowed to be separated from the
kernel unit by a highway, river or any other natural or man-made structure that might
serve as a barrier or border. In densely populated areas each cluster consists of 11
units, whereas in more rural areas, a cluster might contain fewer units, due to longer
distances. Overall, the clusters are considered to be a much better representative of a
neighborhood than census tracts or an area identified by zip-code level would be. In
1985, the total number of housing units in this special neighbor sample is 7,350. In
1989 and 1993 the same units in their respective clusters were revisited. Accounting
for new construction in the existing clusters and the housing market overall, some
units are added to the sample and interviewed. This leads to an increase of clusters
in the sample, as well as an increase in the number of housing units in each cluster,
now consisting of up to 20 housing units per cluster. The neighbor samples include
8433 and 11,293 housing units in 1989 and 1993 respectively.
This study focuses on single-family housing units, excluding multi-unit struc-
tures, mobile homes, units in transient hotels and others that do not meet the single-
family house definition. In addition, only owner-occupied units that were regular
interviewed units are of interest, since units that are being rented or non-interviewed
units (e.g. vacant units), do not display the owner’s self-reported housing value.
Lastly, after excluding observations that did not meet the preliminary requirements
or had missing values, observations located in neighborhoods with less than four
owner-occupied single-family housing units were dropped. This final data adjust-
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ment is necessary since neighborhood quality and amenities are measured based on
the neighbor’s information and might be biased if there are not enough neighbor’s
observed within a cluster. Pooling over the three waves of the data, there are 508
neighborhoods included in this study. There are 6,253 observations in total, where
the average cluster contains 12.3 observations.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main variables used in this study,
including housing characteristics, demographics of occupants, neighborhood charac-
teristics and indicators for racially different neighborhoods. It is important to note
that value refers to the owners’ self-reported estimate of the value of his property.
While it is possible that individuals could over- or under-estimate the value of their
home Kiel and Zabel (1999) show that even though owners on average overestimate
the value by about 5 percent there is no indication that this happens systematically
more for specific groups, based on neighborhoods, house characteristics or demograph-
ics. The authors find that new home owners tend to be the ones that overestimate,
but this declines the longer an owner lives in his home; to overcome the potential
overestimation problem, this study controls for tenure.
3.1. Neighborhood Characteristics
The survey covers an array of neighborhood questions and the level of satis-
faction of the respondent. These questions vary from objective observations (such as
if there is an elementary school within a mile or if there is an abandoned property
within 300 feet of one’s house) to subjective evaluations of satisfaction of maintenance
and quality of the neighborhood (such as level of noise, condition of roads, if there are
bothersome problems or even crime within the neighborhood). The averages of these
observations of each cluster are used to proxy for neighborhood amenities. Addition-
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ally, for some of the variables of interest (i.e. crime, bad road conditions, problems
within a neighborhood and the existence of a unit with bars on the windows) dummy
variables are created, and these are used in some of the later regressions. Averages for
neighbors’ housing characteristics (e.g. number of rooms, value and property square
footage), average level of education of the respondents and the average household
income are calculated to proxy for neighborhood quality.8
3.2. Neighborhood Types
According to Webster’s definition, a neighborhood is “a section lived in by
neighbors and usually having distinguishing characteristics” (Merriam-Webster dic-
tionary). Based on this definition, one can think of many different ways to define
neighborhood types. This study focuses on the racial composition of a neighbor-
hood. In the survey respondents are asked to identify their race, where the choices
are “white”, “black” or “other” (which include Chinese, American Indians, Japanese
etc.). Most of the existing literature regarding racial differences in housing is con-
cerned with differences between “blacks” and “whites”, raising the question of how to
treat “others” (who make up less than 4 percent of the sample). Following convention,
“others” and “whites” are combined.9 The racial variable is then used to calculate
percentages of racial composition for each neighborhood. As in Myers (2004), dummy
variables are constructed for “black neighborhood”, which is composed of at least 30
percent black households, “white neighborhood”, consisting of at least 85 percent
of white households and “integrated neighborhoods”, which consists of black house-
holds between 15–30 percent. Table 2 contains selected averages for each type of
8The results did not change when the median was used instead of the neighborhood averages.
The corresponding results can be obtained upon request.
9Keeping “other” as a separate group and only including them in “integrated” neighborhood does
not change the results.
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neighborhood.
While the focus of this research is on the externality effect of a vacant unit,
which is used as a proxy for foreclosure, in different types of neighborhoods, another
important consideration is where (e.g. rural, urban or center-city), these types of
neighborhoods are located. Due to the immobility of housing, Kiel and Zabel (2008)
test whether including MSA, town and street-level control variables in estimating
hedonic housing price equations matters. Using those three location variables, they
find that all three levels are significant and conclude that people care not only about
the street their house is located on, but also about the town they live in and even
the broader area. This result becomes very clear when thinking about neighborhoods
within a city; even if the neighborhoods appear identical in quality, the housing
prices of similar housing units located in different neighborhoods can vary significantly
depending on the location of the neighborhood. Houses located closer to the city-
center, parks or train station tend to be more desirable and therefore might be valued
higher, ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, the AHS does not report the actual distance
to location points that might be correlated with the value of a housing unit. Luckily,
this study is able to overcome this data limitation by grouping housing units into
neighborhoods, where each house within a cluster has a similar distance to locations
of interest. Based on Kiel and Zabel’s findings of the importance of location, this
study hypothesizes that the effect of a vacant house in an urban area, where housing
units could be considerably closer to one another within a given neighborhood than
in a rural area, might be different from the effect on a house located in the city
center or rural area. Therefore, control variables are included that define additional
‘locations’, specifically, the general region (north, west, mid-west, and south) and
area type (center-city, urban, other urban or rural area).
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3.3. Vacancy - proxy variable for foreclosure
Foreclosure is a financial state of an occupant, describing a distress situation
of a housing unit’s owner and not necessarily of the unit. A neighbor might not be
able to observe that someone within close proximity has entered the foreclosure state,
especially if a property is in the early stages of the foreclosure process where it would
be hard to observe a difference in the appearance of the property at all. Therefore, the
potential negative effect of a foreclosed unit would begin to occur after a considerable
amount of time has passed where the owner stops doing maintenance on his property.
People invest time and money into the upkeep of their house and property as long as
they can enjoy the benefit of it. An individual who has entered into foreclosure will
be less likely to maintain his landscape, fix leaks in the roof to protect the structure
from rotting internally or put on a new coat of paint.
Spivack (1991) shows that ownership patterns and vacancies are the most
influential determinants of maintenance and upkeep decisions of homeowners. In
cases where the foreclosure process leads to a relatively quick turn-over, such as in
a short sale, and a new owner occupies the house relatively soon after, one would
expect relatively little decay of the housing unit. Hence, the anticipated spillovers
from a foreclosure would not be present. While the special neighbor sample does
not include financial observations regarding mortgage obligations and property tax
payments, making it impossible to have a foreclosure variable based on the financial
state, the interviewer asks respondents whether there are abandoned houses within
300 feet from their home. An abandoned house may be the end-result of a foreclosure,
when owners owe more on their home than it is worth and consequently choose to
abandon their home. Therefore, “abandoned structure” is used to estimate the impact
of foreclosures, and the estimates may provide an upper bound of the foreclosure effect
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on housing value, since at that point the unit in distress is probably at its worse in
terms of upkeep. Thus, it would have the largest negative effect on the surrounding
properties and neighborhood. Considering that the foreclosure process itself, at the
least, will take 6–12 months, by the time houses are vacated, they most likely are in
worse shape in appearance than the ones that have not experienced a similar fate. In
addition to using the abandoned unit variable as a proxy for foreclosure, a dummy
variable is constructed for each neighborhood indicating that at least one interviewee
responded that there is an abandoned house in close proximity.
Note that as a result of the design of the data used in this study (mainly the
elimination of housing units that do not meet preliminary requirements), the likeli-
hood of an abandoned structure to be located in a neighborhood that is considered a
“slum” is very small. This study uses only neighborhoods with at least four owner-
occupied, single-family houses with no missing values. In addition, assuming that
the housing value is correlated with wealth, a neighborhood’s average housing value
can then be seen as an indicator of how “nice” a neighborhood is, where the higher
the value, the nicer the neighborhood. The neighborhoods’ average housing value
across the entire sample ranges from $17,016 to $543,006 compared to the average
value of neighborhoods with a vacant structure present, which ranges from $24,190
to $483,953. This shows that it is not necessarily the “poorest” neighborhoods that
have an abandoned structure. Most studies researching a foreclosure effect use sales
data, municipality tax data or other financial data that directly reflect the foreclo-
sure state. Although this represents “true” foreclosure, it might not necessarily be
the best representative for evaluating the externality associated with a foreclosed unit
on nearby properties. This study presents a good alternative to the financial fore-
closure variable and instead uses a proxy variable for foreclosure - having a vacant
structure within 300 feet. The decay of a house resulting from the lack of upkeep,
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arguably is the cause of a decrease in surrounding properties’ values, hence making
it an appropriate proxy variable that seems to be picking up the spillover effect of a
foreclosure.
4. The Statistical Model
The utility a person gets from housing consumption varies greatly across indi-
viduals. Each unit is comprised of many unique characteristics. Bundled together in
various ways, these characteristics will be valued differently not just dependent on a
person’s preference, but also the location. Having air conditioning in a geographical
area where the average temperature is high will be valued more than having one in
an area with more cold days in a given year. In addition, the location and the ac-
companying amenities will greatly influence the valuation as well. A well-maintained
neighborhood, where the neighbors are friendly and the overall feeling is a communal
one would generally be preferred to one where crime is observed and people are suspi-
cious of the people who live nearby. Hence, it is necessary to look at each component
individually and its impact on the value. An hedonic pricing model permits taking a
variety of characteristics into consideration in order to estimate the marginal effects
these have on the value of a house.
A large amount of research estimates the impact of housing characteristics, and
various other factors that contribute to an individual’s utility function of housing, on
the price of a property. In order to separate out the individual components and
to estimate the effect of those factors (especially an abandoned unit), on the value
of owner-occupied surrounding property values, an hedonic housing price model is
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estimated. The base reduced-form model is,
ln(valueit) = α +Xitβ1 + Zitβ2 + β3vacantit + vit, (1)
where ln(valueit) is the log of an owner’s self-reported housing value. The vector Xit
contains observable house characteristics as well as demographics of the occupants.
Neighborhood characteristics, excluding vacancies, are included in the vector Zit.
The last variable in the equation, vacant, is the foreclosure proxy, identifying an
abandoned structure within 300 feet.10 A more detailed description of the variables
used in the hedonic pricing regression can be found in Table 3.
Myers finds evidence of differing racial price gradients within housing markets.
A price gradient can be defined as the measure of changes in housing value as the
racial composition of a neighborhood changes. Her general findings show that prices in
neighborhoods decline as the ratio of black to white owners increases. She argues that
this is evidence for the existence of racial discrimination in the housing market based
on exclusion, a result from supplier discrimination and people prejudice combined.11
The notion of different valuation gradients, based on the type of racial composition,
leads to the question of whether foreclosures might impact neighboring housing values
differently not just based on distance (as has been suggested in the literature), but
also on the type of neighborhood.
To investigate these questions, a specification measuring the effect of a vacant
structure in “black neighborhoods” versus “white neighborhoods” and “integrated
neighborhoods” is estimated. Generally, it is possible that one specific type of neigh-
10In some regressions a dummy variable is used to indicate the existence of at least one foreclosure
within a neighborhood. It is possible that in spatially large neighborhoods a foreclosure could be
located far from some units and therefore the impact on the value of those housing units could be
much smaller.
11A complete explanation of the specification of racially different neighborhoods and how the price
gradient of housing differs based on the racial composition can be found in Myers (2004).
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borhood exhibits more of the characteristics that, on average, are less desired, hence
the price gradient for housing is likely to be different across neighborhood types. The
detailed information available on housing units, occupants’ characteristics and the
neighborhood, permit controlling for those potential differences. The neighborhood
variables of interest are defined in Table 4. The model
ln(valueit) = α +Xitβ1 + Zitβ2 + β4bhoodit + β5inthoodit
+ β6bhood× vacantit + β7ihood× vacantit + β3vacantit + vit
(2)
is estimated to determine the foreclosure effect in racially differentiated neighbor-
hoods. The dummy variable for houses located in a neighborhood defined as black is
bhood, and inthood indicates a unit in an integrated neighborhood. A house located
in a black neighborhood with a nearby vacancy is captured by the interaction term
bhood× vacant, and inthood× vacant represents a nearby vacancy of a housing unit
in an integrated neighborhood.
5. Estimation and Results
The raw data are an unbalanced panel spanning 8 years, which would suggest
the use of fixed or random effects in the estimation. However, given the nature of
housing (i.e. the main characteristics, such as rooms, baths, etc. being fairly stable
over time) there is not much temporal variation in the data. Therefore, fixed effects
would ‘wash away’ much of the effect, leading to noisy estimates.
The availability of detailed information of neighboring properties’ characteris-
tics, their inhabitants and general neighborhood amenities, is a unique feature of the
data. In order to see how inclusion of detailed information on neighbors and neigh-
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borhood “quality” impacts the results, various semi-log specifications are estimated.
The semi-log specification does not just allow the dollar value of each characteristic
to vary, it also makes the interpretation of the coefficient easy and intuitive; based
on a unit change of the characteristic, the coefficient estimate can be understood as
the percentage change in housing value. 12
Table 5 shows the results of selected variables for the different specifications
testing the model. Column one gives results of the most basic specification, including
only house-specific characteristics and demographics of its occupants, while control-
ling for survey year and occupants’ tenure. Number of rooms, bathrooms, age of the
house, whether there was any water leaking into the house within the last 12 month
and if the unit has any cracks or holes in floors, walls or ceiling are just some of the
housing characteristics included. The demographic traits include age, marital status,
gender, income and years of education, etc.13 The point estimate on the abandoned
house variable, which is significant at .01, suggests that living within 300 feet of such
a unit decreases a housing unit’s value by about 31.2 percent. The coefficients can
be interpreted as the percentage change in housing value, since the left hand side
variable of the model equation is in log form.
Column two shows results for the second specification, which includes neigh-
borhood characteristics, such as the average demographics in the neighborhood (e.g.
mean level of education and mean neighborhood income), the average characteristics
of the surrounding units as well as other controls representing neighborhood quality
(e.g. the percentage of reference people within a neighborhood reporting neighbor-
hood problems, crime and bothersome noise). Not surprisingly, a unit’s value is lower
12The non-linearity of the equation being estimated requires caution when interpreting the regres-
sion coefficient of dummy variables, since they slightly overestimate the effect. To overcome this
issues the interpretation of the coefficients on dummy variables is done using the Peter E. Kennedy
estimator (Kennedy (1981)), which allows for a less bias interpretation.
13A full list of variables included in all regressions is available in Table 4..
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if located in a neighborhood where some of the respondents report bothersome neigh-
borhood problems (problems). Intuitively, people do not want to live in an area
where they do not feel comfortable, maybe feel unsafe walking around or even fear
that their property will be violated. Therefore, houses in neighborhoods with less
desired qualities will be valued less. The coefficient on average years of education,
which is significant at the one percentile, can be interpreted that housing units in
neighborhoods with higher educated people are, on average, more valuable. This
may suggest that people prefer to live in neighborhoods where the inhabitants are
more accomplished, which usually is correlated with higher paying jobs and therefore
might portray higher quality characteristics than a neighborhood where people earn
less money and are lower skilled. As the neighborhood level controls are added to
the regression, the negative effect of a vacant house on the value of a close-by home
decreases substantially to 14.5 percent, significant at .01. This indicates that the
effect of an empty structure might be different based on the type of neighborhood it
is located in.
Neighborhoods are categorized into different types based on racial composi-
tion. Prior research shows that housing value, for an identical unit, changes as more
black people move into a neighborhood (Harris, 1999 ). The results for the third
specification, which is considered the full model specification, are reported in column
3. In addition to owner, house and neighborhood characteristics, neighborhood type
dummies and interaction terms of neighborhood type and a nearby vacant structure
are included.
The marginal effect of vacancy on the expected housing value now depends
on the type of neighborhood a house is located in. From equation two, the marginal
21





β3 if bhood = 0, inthood = 0
β3 + β6 if bhood = 1, inthood = 0
β3 + β7 if bhood = 0, inthood = 1.
In Table 5, column 3, the coefficient on vacant, −.06, can be interpreted as the effect
nearby foreclosure will have on the housing value in a white neighborhood; however
this is not statistically different from zero. The estimated value of β6 indicates that a
house located near an abandoned structure within a black neighborhood has a lower
value of about 25.7 percent, compared to the same unit in a white neighborhood,
significant at .05. Living in a black neighborhood with a vacant unit present versus
a black neighborhood with no vacancies can lead to a decrease in housing value of 30
percent, significant at .05. There are very few observations for integrated neighbor-
hoods and even fewer for integrated neighborhoods with a vacant structure present.
Therefore, it is not surprising, that the coefficient on inthood × vacant, β7, has a
large standard error. Due to the data limitation, the focus of the analyses is on the
difference between white and black neighborhoods.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a much smaller foreclosure effect
in predominantly white neighborhoods versus black neighborhoods. An F -test is
performed to test the hypothesis that the foreclosure effect is equal in all types of
neighborhoods. Based on the large F -statistics the null hypothesis can be rejected.
These findings contribute to the branch of research suggesting that there is racial
discrimination within the housing market (whether it comes from prejudice or supplier
discrimination), since it indicates that the negative effect of an abandoned structure
within a black or integrated neighborhood is worse than in a white neighborhood.
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Although this study controls for many neighborhood characteristics, the re-
gression results could be influenced by other negative factors that are generally asso-
ciated with racially different neighborhoods. As depicted in Table 2, housing values in
predominantly black neighborhoods in general are lower than in white neighborhoods.
A possible explanation could be that the housing units themselves are of lower quality,
as a consequence of being built with cheaper materials and less experienced builders.
Unfortunately, there is no way to control for these types of differences given the data.
Another possible driving factor could be the general location a certain neighborhood
is in. A black neighborhood in the city-center might arguably be different than a
black neighborhood in the suburbs. Hence, controlling for location is vital, and this
study approaches this problem by including regional as well as location type variables
(i.e. city-center, urban, other urban and rural).
Columns 4–6 (Table 5) depict the results of including regional and area type
variables to the first three specifications. In almost all specifications the coefficients
on the location variables are highly significant, indicating that people are not just
concerned with the immediate neighborhood they live in, but also the general area
and region. After controlling for location, the coefficient on vacant in the basic
model remains about the same at −0.35. In the fifth specification (column 5), the
point estimate is significant at .01 and suggests a decrease in housing value of 15
percent in the presence of a foreclosure. In the full specification model (column 6),
the point estimate of a foreclosed structure within a black neighborhood, significant
at .1 indicates a decrease in the housing value of a unit located within 300 feet of
such structure to be about 20 percent. The coefficient on vacant remains small, at
−.09, but is now significant at .1. These findings suggest that even after controlling
for many factors that are believed to affect a house’s value the impact of a foreclosure
on nearby property values differ based on the racial composition of a neighborhood.
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All of the specifications are also estimated using a dummy variable to indicate
whether there is an abandoned house in the neighborhood, compared to a dummy
indicating that a foreclosure is within 300 feet, results are shown in Table 6. While the
signs on the coefficient for ‘foreclosure’ stay the same in all specifications, significant
at the one percentile, the magnitude slightly decreases. The decrease supports the
believe, that the negative spillover of a foreclosed unit gets smaller with an increase in
distance. Interestingly, the magnitude of the marginal effect of a vacancy conditional
on the type of neighborhood it is in, increases (in absolute value). The coefficient
on vacant unit in a black neighborhood versus one in white neighborhood is −.33,
significant at .01. (in the last specification which includes all location controls as well
as neighborhood type variables). These results are very similar to the results in the
prior estimations (in Table 5). Indicating that the foreclosure effect found is not due
to the particular construction of the foreclosure proxy variable.
6. Conclusion
The recent housing-bubble bust has led to particularly high numbers of fore-
closures, negatively impacting home owners, neighborhoods, municipalities and the
economy as a whole. In order to help the recovery and lessen the burden, the federal
government has provided financial aid in a number of ways (e.g., the Neighborhood
Stabilization Act), but the benefits of this type of government involvement are un-
certain. If the foreclosure effect is not as bad as often assumed, this money might
be better spent on other programs. Throughout the past two decades, an increasing
amount of research has focused on investigating the externality effect of foreclosure
on surrounding property values. While the results differ regarding the magnitude,
there is a general consensus that a negative foreclosure effect exists. In addition, it
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has been shown that the effect lessens the farther away a foreclosure is located, in
fact the distance considered “far” is fairly small, around 1/8 of a mile.
Housing markets throughout the U.S. differ considerably. Due to data limi-
tation, most studies focus on a small housing market, such as a specific county in
Ohio, or the city of Chicago, making a generalization of research results not possi-
ble. This study uses a special neighbor sample from the American Housing survey
from 1985, 1989 and 1993. The pooled data consist of 6,253 observations, so-called
‘cluster’ units, and their closest 10 neighbors. Housing units are clustered into very
small neighborhoods, which are located across 46 states, and the neighborhoods are
categorized into three different types (i.e. black, white or integrated), based on race.
Spillovers from foreclosures are often attributed to the general decay of the unit
due to a lack of maintenance. Therefore, this study uses a foreclosure proxy variable,
that captures the negative spillover effect. Observing an abandoned structure within
300 feet of an interviewed housing unit, is used to proxy for foreclosure.
This research finds that the value of a housing unit decreases by approximately
15 percent if it is located within 300 feet of an abandoned structure. Much of the
previous literature focuses on how housing values are impacted by the existence of
a foreclosure within a close-knit territory (i.e. a neighborhood), where the measure
of what is considered a neighborhood differs widely in size across research projects,
with some as big as census tracts (up to 8000 housing units per neighborhood) and
others much smaller, such as a city block. Importantly, housing values seem to be
impacted only if a foreclosed house is within close proximity to the property. In other
words, a foreclosure in a rural neighborhood of 1 square mile will have a much more
limited impact on housing values compared to a foreclosure in a dense, urban street
neighborhood.
Additionally, this study’s findings suggest that the foreclosure effect differs, de-
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pending on the type of neighborhood a vacant house is in. Living in a house located
near a foreclosed structure within a black neighborhood approximately decreases the
house’s value by 18.5 percent. Which is considerably larger than the decrease in hous-
ing value when not controlling for racial composition of the neighborhood. Overall,
the findings are consistent with previous studies that focus on negative externalities
resulting from foreclosure, the importance of location (e.g. urban, rural, suburban)
on housing price, and findings on racial discrimination in housing prices.
From a policy viewpoint, the ability to test neighborhood effects on the value
of housing is interesting and important, and can be useful in predicting the devel-
opment of housing markets, which are a large component of our economy. While
foreclosure certainly has a very large impact on a person’s current and potentially
future financial situation, the effect on neighbors and the community might not be
as large as previously believed in every housing market. Since many housing poli-
cies are federal policies, housing research provides useful insights for policy makers,
which is particularly important considering how much money has been provided to



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average house value $ 167,411 118,273 119,322
Average number rooms 6.54 6.37 6.04
Average square footage 1,949 1,782 1,688
Household
Average number of people in house 2.81 2.93 2.98
Percent married 71.31 55.82 65.13
Average years of school 17.49 14.89 17.74
Average annual household income ($) 68,431 50,946 63,271
Neighborhood
percent of people reporting:
Crime 20.2 34.6 23.5
Bad roads 17.1 36.4 23.5
Neighborhood problems 37.9 41.6 51.3
Vacant structures 1.7 9.1 0.8
Number of Observations 5,479 541 238
Number of Neighborhoods 431 47 30








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Name and Description of Variables
Variable Name Description
Dependent Variable
value self-reported owner-estimated market value of property
Unit Characteristics
rooms number of rooms in unit
baths number of bathrooms in unit
half baths number of half bathrooms in unit
unitsf square footage of unit
ac indicator if you unit has air condition (central or window units)
porch indicator if unit has porch, balcony or deck
garage indicator if unit has garage or covered parking space
leak indicator if water leaked into the unit in the last 12 months
holes indicator if unit has holes in floor
cracks indicator if cracks or holes in wall or ceiling in unit
built age of the unit
singlefamily indicator if it is a single-family housing unit
Household Characteristics
age age of reference person
agesq age squared of reference person
per number of people living in the unit
married indicator if reference person is married
male indicator if reference person is male
grade1 years of education of reference person
ln(income) log of total household income
movedin years reference person has lived in unit
Characteristics of Neighborhood
nage mean age of reference people in neighborhood
nperson mean number of people in household in neighborhood
pctmarried percent of married couples in neighborhood
pctowner percent of owner-occupied housing in neighborhood
nlnincome log of mean household income in neighborhood
meaneducation average years of schooling of all reference people in neighborhood
nhousingcharacteristics average of all housing characteristics in neighborhood
(e.g. rooms, bathrooms, ac, age of units, square footage, garage, porch, holes, cracks, leak)
pctcrime percent of units reporting crime in neighborhood
pctnprobs percent of units reporting bothersome problems within neighborhood
pctebarcl percent of units in neighborhood for which enumerator observed bars on windows
Location and Year Dummies
city indicator that unit is in central city of MSA
rural idicator that unit is in rural area
urban indicator that unit is in urban area
other urban indicator that unit is in an urban area other than outside a metropolitan city
north indicator that unit is located in the north
south indicator that unit is located in the south
west indicator that unit is located in the west
midwest indicator that unit is located in the mid west
y85 indicator that unit was observed in 85
y89 indicator that unit was observed in 89
y93 indicator that unit was observed in 93
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Table 1.4: Name and Description of Variables continued
Variable Name Description
Type of Neighborhood variables
black indicator that reference person is black
white indicator that reference person is white
other indicator if reference person is neither black or white (e.g. Asian, Native American)
pctblack percentage of houses with black reference person
pctwhite percentage of houses with white reference person
bhood indicator for black neighborhood (>30% of black)
whood indicator for white neighborhood (<15% of black)
inthood indicator for integrated neighborhood
(15% <of black reference people >30%
vacant indicator the at least one person in neighborhood observes
an abandondened/vandalized structure within 300 feet
pctvacant percentage of abandoned houses in neighborhood
vacantd indicator that at least one abandoned structure in neighborhood
bhood ×vacant indicator for being in a black neighborhood with an abandoned unit nearby
whood ×vacant indicator for being in a white neighborhood with an abandoned unit nearby
inthood ×vacant indicator for being in an integrated neighborhood with an abandoned unit nearby
31
Table 1.5: Selected Hedonic Price Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing Characteristics
# of rooms 0.0532*** 0.0577*** 0.0568*** 0.0481*** 0.0583*** 0.0578***
(0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0067)
# of baths 0.186*** 0.0425*** 0.0421*** 0.155*** 0.0376*** 0.0375***
(0.0218) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0190) (0.0161) (0.016)
unit’s age −0.0238** −0.0296** −0.0292** −0.0234** −0.0294** −0.029***
(0.0037) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Owner Characteristics
married 0.0892*** 0.0272 0.0216 0.0763*** 0.0251 0.0212
(0.0210) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0165) (0.0165)
years of education 0.0168*** 0.00236** 0.00243** 0.0130*** 0.00222** 0.00229**
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012)
log of income 0.119*** 0.0127** 0.0130** 0.0920*** 0.0142** 0.0141**
(0.0133) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0111) (0.0078) (0.0078)
Neighbor’s Characteristics and Demographics
mean # rooms −0.102*** −0.0944*** −0.0914*** −0.0883***
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0098) (0.0098)
mean # baths 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.171***
(0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0257) (0.0257)
average age of units 0.0504*** 0.0498*** 0.0546*** 0.0529***
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0068)
mean of lnincome 0.926*** 0.904*** 0.763.*** 0.746***
(0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0226) (0.0228)
average level of education 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0076*** 0.0079***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Neighborhood
problems (%) −0.0225 −0.0370 −0.1070*** −0.1120***
(0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0291) (0.0292)
crime (%) −0.0608* −0.0468 −0.0793** −0.0739**





bhood x vacant −0.298** −0.2050*
(0.1240) (0.0111)
inthood x vacant 0.194 0.1580
(0.138) (0.15)
vacant −0.3730*** −0.1570*** −0.0614 −0.3510*** −0.1640*** −0.0982*
(0.0695) (0.0573) (0.0626) (0.05660) (0.0520) (0.0595)
Constant 9.137*** 0.473*** 0.673*** 9.837*** 2.441*** 2.637***
(0.1090) (0.2240) (0.2250) (0.1010) (0.2280) (0.2300)
Observations 6,253 6,253 6,253 6,253 6,253 6,253
R-squared 0.351 0.546 0.549 0.492 0.603 0.604
Owner Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Neighborhood Characteristics N Y Y N Y Y
Neighborhood Type Dummy N N Y N N Y
Geographic Characteristics N N N Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Table 5 presents the results of estimating an hedonic price model with log of house value as the dependent
variable and a dummy variable to indicate whether there is a vacant house within 300 feet. Columns 4–6 include
additional location variables that are not reported.
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Table 1.6: Selected Hedonic Price Regression Results (using a Neighborhood dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing Characteristics
# of rooms 0.0533*** 0.0580*** 0.0568*** 0.0480*** 0.0587*** 0.0580***
(0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0067)
# of baths 0.1900*** 0.0431** 0.0435*** 0.1570*** 0.0384*** 0.0389***
(0.0212) (0.0172) (0.0166) (0.0184) (0.0158) (0.0154)
unit’s age −0.0238*** −0.0296*** −0.0295*** −0.0234*** −0.0294*** −0.0292***
(0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Owner Characteristics
married 0.0892*** 0.0272 0.0204 0.0763*** 0.0251 0.0194
(0.0210) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0165) (0.0164)
years of education 0.0160*** 0.00228* 0.00239* 0.0121*** 0.0021* 0.0022*
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012)
log of income 0.1190*** 0.0127** 0.0134** 0.0920*** 0.0141** 0.0146**
(0.0072) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Neighbor’s House Demographics and Characteristics
mean # rooms −0.1020*** −0.0929*** −0.0914*** −0.0871***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0097)
mean # baths 0.183*** 0.178*** 0.171*** 0.177***
(0.0245) (0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0238)
mean age of units 0.0504*** 0.0503*** 0.0546*** 0.0537***
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0068)
mean of lnincome 0.926*** 0.891*** 0.763*** 0.730***
(0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0226) (0.0228)
average level of education 0.0096*** 0.0094*** 0.0076*** 0.0079***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Neighborhood
problems (%) −0.0225 −0.0403 −0.1070*** −0.1150***
(0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0291) (0.0290)
crime (%) −0.0588* −0.0558 −0.0763** −0.0781*





bhood x vacant −0.375*** −0.278***
(0.0832) (0.0763)
inthood x vacant 0.285*** 0.2810***
(0.0730) (0.07454)
vacant −0.3350*** −0.0989*** −0.0061 −0.3200*** −0.1280*** −0.0543
(0.0399) (0.0335) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0312) (0.0335)
Constant 9.137*** 0.473** 0.810*** 9.837*** 2.441*** 2.795***
(0.109) (0.224) (0.225) (0.101) (0.228) (0.230)
Observations 6,253 6,253 6,253 6,253 6,253 6,253
R-squared 0.357 0.546 0.551 0.497 0.604 0.606
Owner Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Neighborhood Characteristics N Y Y N Y Y
Neighborhood Type Dummy N N Y N N Y
Geographic Characteristics N N N Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Table 6 presents the results of estimating an hedonic price model with log of house value as the dependent
variable and a dummy variable to indicate whether there is a vacant house in the neighborhood. Columns 4–6
include additional location variables that are not reported.
33
Chapter 2
The Financial State of
Municipalities and the Effect on
Housing Values
1. Introduction
In recent years concerns about the financial stability of local govern-
ments have risen significantly. Detroit, MI and Harrisburg, PA are just two
examples of cities that have experienced tremendous financial problems over
the last 10 years. Considering the increase in the number of municipal
bankruptcy filings since the early 2000s (http://www.governing.com/gov-data/
municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html), such concerns
might seem appropriate. Although, the number of municipalities that have formally
entered bankruptcy is small, a number of local governments have experienced fiscal
strain during the past 30 years. While there seems to be no consensus in the litera-
ture regarding what exactly qualifies a municipality to be in financial distress, some
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financial measures that provide a way to test the fiscal solvency of a local government
have been developed and more or less accepted.
A local government could find itself in a financially undesirable situation for
a number of reasons. The recent economic and financial literature focused on the
relationship between revenues, capital expenditure and debt incurred by local gov-
ernments (DeSanto et al., 1991, Watson et al. 1995, Kloha et al. 2005, Trussell and
Patrick, 2009, 2011). One of the prime reasons for concern comes from the investment
side. As a municipality displays signs of financial strain it becomes harder to raise
funds, by issuing bonds, to pay for various capital outlays and other local government
projects. Another potential impact has not received much attention from a research
point of view– the impact on housing values in financially distress municipalities.
The hedonic pricing literature is vast, as researchers attempt to quantify the
impact of individual housing characteristics, neighborhood demographics and ameni-
ties on the value of housing units. A large portion of the literature shows the impor-
tance of school quality on housing prices. In the Tiebout sorting model, homeowners
self-select into areas with amenities that satisfy their desires (Bayer et al., 2004; Fack
and Grenet ,2010: Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, 2011). However, few studies have in-
vestigated the link between a city’s fiscal solvency and its impact on housing values.
The primary objective of this study is to show the effect of cities financial state has
on housing prices. In a traditional hedonic framework, it can be expected that the
revenues collected by a city, debt incurred and capital outlays will directly impact
the provision of high quality roads, schools, public places and other public services
that affect the quality of life for the cities’ residents. Homeowners in localities that
are unable to provide a sufficient level of public service or have a large decline in the
service previously provided may experience a decline in their housing value due to the
decrease in the city’s ‘attractiveness’ and the potential resulting decline in housing
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demand.
This study uses four different data sources to construct a data set suitable to
investigate the effect of municipality’s financial state on housing values. The data
contain information on 68,882 housing units located in 175 different cities across 42
states. Following the financial literature, financial ratios are constructed to proxy
for four types of a city’s financial solvency; cash-solvency, budget solvency, long-term
solvency and service solvency. In line with findings of Trussell and Patrick (2009), the
results suggest that cities with a higher revenue to end-of-year debt ratio, measuring
cities cash-solvency, on average have higher housing values in subsequent years. The
higher ratio indicates that a city is financially stable, at least in the short-run and is
likely able to provide the kinds of services and amenities that residents value, therefore
increasing housing demand. A “beautify the downtown” campaign may, in fact, lead
residents to want to live in the urban center; examples include San Diego, CA and
Greenville, SC, though the outcomes have been a mix of success and failure.
On the other hand, cities with a high revenue to capital outlays ratio tend to
have lower housing values. Many of the amenities that provide utility to residents,
such as highways construction and repair, building of green places and improved
school quality, require capital outlay. If a city’s revenues are not used for such ex-
penses residents might be more likely to move, decreasing the demand for housing and
housing prices. These results provide evidence that the financial stability of a city
has a positive impact on housing values, whereas cities that are financially unstable
will impact housing values negatively. A more detailed analysis of all solvency mea-
sures can be found in the result section. The paper is organized as follows: Section
II looks at the previous literature, Section III presents the data, Section IV presents
the model and results and Section V concludes.
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2. Literature
Over the years there have been numerous theories attempting to explain
changes in housing prices. Several studies investigate how regulatory mechanisms
imposed by local and state government affect local housing prices. Courant (1976)
shows that zoning restrictions increased housing prices. Katz and Rosen (1987) sug-
gest that municipal regulated land-use prevents cheaper land from being developed,
especially impacting lower-income and middle-income residents. These regulations
keep housing prices artificially high imposing higher costs on home builders, which
are passed through to municipal residents. Katz and Rosen (1987) find that housing
prices are 17 percent to 38 percent higher in communities with extensive land-use
regulations.
Pollakowski and Wachter (1990) note that, since regulations are not inde-
pendent of each other, investigating them one-by-one, such as land-use constraint
singularly, lower the net total impact on housing prices. Land-use constraints might
be an explicit regulation that limits the number of housing units available to lower-
income individuals within a community (the implicit regulation). At the same time, it
boosts median income and, with that, revenues collected from ‘over-inflated’ housing
prices. As individuals are able to move between municipalities, these areas may alter
the regulatory framework or provide differential services to generate a desire for indi-
viduals to move there (such as limiting the number of lower-income houses that can
be built, increasing the supply of high-income individuals who would want to move
into the municipality). The authors find that land-use regulations increase housing
prices and developed land prices, which potentially limits the entry of lower-income
individuals into the municipality. However, municipality land-use regulations cause
spillover effects to other municipalities, mitigating (somewhat) the negative effects on
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lower-income individuals. Malpezzi (1996) does not limit regulation to land-use con-
straints, but finds that the regulatory regimes of municipalities raises housing rents
and lowers homeownership rates.
Kane, Staiger, and Reigg (2005) investigate the impact of de-regulation on
housing values. They find that housing prices are influenced by the amenities of a
locality, such as school quality. The authors show that there are differences in housing
prices along the boundary of school districts, and argue that these results mitigate
the impacts school desegregation.
Many housing and urban development studies have focused on changes in
housing prices as a response to municipalities competing for desirable individuals, a
modification of the traditional Tiebout sorting model, where municipalities offer the
amenities that will attract the most desirable individuals. Rhode and Strumpf (2003)
note that movement by households into geographic areas that are closely aligned
with their own demographic features, such as race, are inconsistent with the Tiebout
model, where residential choice depends solely on local public goods. They argue
that individuals will sort into more homogeneous communities over time. Bayer et al.
(2004) note that school quality plays a central role in the determination of housing
demand. Individuals tend to create communities with like-minded individuals, and
sort themselves based on the amenities provided by these localities. Thus, with a
decline in services, such as school quality, housing demand may be adversely affected
as individuals seek to find alternative locales. Fack and Grenet (2010) find that better
public schools lead to an increase in housing demand and an increase in housing prices
of 1.4 to 2.4-percent. However, the authors also find that these housing price effects
may be minimized with the availability of alternatives, such as private schools. This
finding is supported by other studies, such as Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011), who
find that, on average, a standard deviation increase in school quality (measured by
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standardized test scores) leads to a rise in housing prices by as much as 4-percent.
Thus, it appears that neighborhood sorting plays a role in housing prices, and changes
to the provision of services will impact housing prices immensely.
Ozannae and Thibodeau (1983) explain that the dispersion of municipal pow-
ers, where there is a greater concentration of municipalities in an area, leads to a lower
value of housing. As the municipalities compete for the scarce desirable individuals,
they change amenities and regulations to lower the value of housing. Likewise, Hen-
dershott and Thibodeau (1990) find that municipalities engage in competition for
services, so that a higher concentration of municipalities leads to lowered housing
prices in that area. Some authors have attempted to explain longer-term changes in
housing prices. DiPasquale (1992) notes that much of the time series movement in
both house prices and the homeownership rate can be explained by changes in the
demand for housing, which is a result of variations in interest rates, inflation, and tax
policies.
After the most recent financial crisis, which began at the end of 2007,where
many cities were impacted by the bust of the housing bubble, many theories have
suggested a variety of causal mechanisms. In contrast to the studies that have found
that housing prices are based on traditional fundamentals, Lai and Van Order (2010)
have noted that the fundamental relationships between housing prices and its causal
factors have changed in recent years.The authors note that these observed fundamen-
tals explain a small fraction of the more recent changes in house prices. Glaeser,
Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010) agree, finding that real interest rate changes had only
a 20-percent impact on the increase in housing demand from 1996 to 2006. They ar-
gue that the fundamental policies that have changed the demand for housing (which
affects the price of housing) have been altered. In a similar vein, Shiller (2009) argues
that traditional fundamentals have not played a large role in explaining huge hous-
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ing price variations, instead irrational exuberance of investors has played a key role.
Soo (2014) investigates the role of these animal spirits, and finds that the positive or
negative tones that are found in newspaper articles influence aggregate price trends
in housing markets by a significant amount.
This study uses the Tiebout sorting model as a starting point and investi-
gates the relationship between housing value and the municipal financial state. Many
studies investigating the solvency of a municipality utilize bond rating, since these
are readily available, whereas detailed financial information on municipalities is more
tedious to collect. As municipal bond ratings decrease (for a variety of reasons, such
as a decrease in the expected solvency of a municipality), people anticipate that the
services the municipality may provide (or the regulations that the municipality will
have to put into place) may not be as unique as they once were (or available at all).
Individuals will vote with their feet and leave the area, depressing housing prices by
decreasing the demand for housing. Thus, the impacts of revenue and expenditure
streams on fiscal solvency can impact the services provided by a municipal, city, or
county government.
Throughout the last 10 years there has been an increase in research studies in
the public finance and financial literature, exploring municipal financial distress, its
causes and how to measure it. While there still seems to be no definite agreement on
the best measures, a variety of factors have been identified, that impact the probability
of financial distress for local governments. Watson et al. (1995) note that these
factors include 1) problems with financial management; 2) a declining population; 3)
structural changes within the city’s economic base; 4) natural or man-made disasters;
and 5) civic distrust. Population decline is similar to Tiebout sorting; people see
increases in crime or deteriorating services and move, which further degrades the tax
base of the local government. Watson et al. (1995) also note that fiscally stressed cities
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are often more receptive to risky economic ventures and strategies in an attempt to
boost the economic prospects and cause people to move back. Watson (1995) includes,
as a case study, the history of Bessemer, Alabama. Bessemer depended for a long
time on the steel industry. The author notes that “Bessemer, Alabama, located
less than twenty miles out of Birmingham, enjoyed a healthy economy for many
decades deeply rooted in the steel industry. Since its founding in 1886, Bessemer
was known as a wealthy industrial city that was economically dependent on a heavy
industrial manufacturing sector and its superior mineral resources. The national
economic changes of the 1970s and 1980s coupled with the ‘lack of competitiveness of
American steel companies’ greatly impacted the local economy in Bessemer. Because
the city had relied so heavily on the iron and steel industries for the employment
of a majority of its residents, changes in the national economy caused Bessemer‘s
unemployment to skyrocket to 35 percent in 1983” (Watson, 1995, pp. 48–49).
A number of studies examine the links between housing values and municipal
or state bond ratings. Liu and Thakor (1984) find that state bond rating differences
are due to four main factors: (1) total net direct debt; (2) per capita debt; (3) the
unemployment rate; and (4) the median home value. The authors find that only the
median home value does not have a significant impact on bond yields. This may lend
credence to this study’s theory, that the causal mechanism, at the least, might work in
the reverse direction. Mason and Rosner (2007) find that the mis-pricing of residential
mortgage backed securities by ratings agencies, caused individuals to discount other
forms of debt, such as municipal bonds, again signifying the traditional link that
people believe, that housing prices affect municipal bond ratings. Denison (2003),
Greenwald (2010), and Nanda and Singh (2004) note that focusing on bond ratings
may be a faulty measure, due to the mis-pricing of bonds by ratings agencies or the
fact that they are covered by insurance, distorting the true price of fiscal solvency.
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In order to analyze the impact of fiscal solvency on the services provided by
a municipality, township, city, county or special district, which potentially has an
impact on the desire of individuals to move to a specific location, a financial mea-
sure has to be constructed. Unfortunately, there are issues with generating testable
conclusions from the multitude of financial distress definitions at a local level. The
GAO (1990) defines fiscal distress as a condition where worse-off residents pay higher
taxes than better-off residents to receive the same services. DeSanto et al. (1991)
define fiscal distress as persistent shortfalls in cash flows. Kloha et al. (2005) define
it as a failure to meet the needs of the community. Raman (1982) defines a fiscally
distressed government as one with a downgraded bond rating; this definition is a bit
weaker, as a downgrade from AAA to AA+ is likely to be a minimal issue.
Trussell and Patrick (2011) operationalize fiscal distress as a persistent de-
cline in revenues to expenses. The authors focus on special districts, which are local
government organizations that are created by local governments to provide a lim-
ited number of services, such as natural resource protection, based on the idea that
these will be more efficient. They find that fiscal distress is positively correlated
with revenue concentration and debt usage. In an earlier study, Trussell and Patrick
(2009) define revenue concentration as the number of revenue streams a district has.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results suggest that fiscally distressed districts have more
diverse revenue sources, lower capital expenditures (likely a proxy for no ability to
generate future revenues or that future distress is indicated by decreases in capital
expenditures), higher debt usage (likely a proxy for a fiscal shortfall), and are larger
in size than non-distressed districts. The most important indicator of fiscal distress
is a low level of capital expenditures relative to total revenues and bond proceeds,
as this means that the district does not have the funds to provide services. Districts
that increase capital expenditures relative to total revenues and bond proceeds by
42
0.10 are associated with a 0.271 decrease in the odds of fiscal distress.
3. Data
3.1. Data Overview
Data for this study are compiled from four different sources; the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) , the United States Government Census, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 1.
Information on housing units’ values and characteristics and household demo-
graphics are drawn from the 2011 IPUMS 1% unweighted sample. The IPUMS data
consist of samples of the American population drawn from the American Commu-
nity Surveys of 2000-2013, and is maintained by the Minnesota Population Center
at the University of Minnesota (Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek,
Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek, 2010). The data pro-
vide detailed information on individual persons and households over time. This study
investigates separately the impact of the financial condition on the value of single-
family housing units and rented units, since individuals residing in rented units do not
report the housing units value, but rather the contracted rent. In order to investigate
the impact of municipalities financial state on the value of the housing units within
the municipality it is vital to observe the geographic location of the housing unit.
While the exact location of each individual in the sample is recorded, confidentiality
requirements prevent use of this information. Since 1990, the smallest observable
geographic areas are places with a population of more than 100,000. Consequently,
less densely populated areas are not identifiable. All observations whose location can
1A more detailed explanation of the data and the matching process appears in the Appendix.
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not be identified to at least the city level and that have missing values are eliminated,
leaving 68,882 observation in 175 different cities, lying in 115 Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs), across 42 states. Summary statistics by city are shown in Table 1.
In order to establish similar sized areas (containing 100,000 people or more) the
Census Bureau separates metropolitan areas into public use micro areas (PUMAs).
This study uses the PUMAs to construct ‘community’ controls, including percentage
of black households, percentage of population with a college degree, mean housing
value, percentage of households married and average age.
It can be expected that, on average, the housing stock of a city with a high
unemployment rate and low-level per capita personal income will be of lower value
than that of a city with low unemployment and high-level per capita personal income,
regardless of the city’s financial state. Therefore, measures are included to control
for differences in economic activity across cities. MSA level economic controls, such
as the unemployment rate, the per capita income and the change in population from
the previous year are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistic ((http://www.bls.
gov/data/)) and Bureau of Economic Analysis websites ((http://www.bea.gov/)).
The financial measures for each city government are drawn from the 2010 U.S.
Census of Government. Since 1850 the U.S. Census has compiled financial statistics of
state and local government on an annual basis. At first only very broad categories were
reported (e.g. tax levies, governmental debt and wealth), but over time the reported
financial data have become more detailed. Today, the financial data consist of over 700
different variables describing different revenue sources (taxes, interest income, etc.),
expenditures (government workers’ wages, education, safety, etc.) and indebtedness
(long-term and short-term debt, interest payment, etc.) of each government type.
The 2010 Census of government consists of 24,447 observations, of which 3,512 are
cities within the U.S. Only the cities that match the IPUMS sample are used. The
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financial variables are used to construct measures that represent a cities financial
state.
3.2. Financial Condition Measures
Fiscal hardship can result from either reduced revenues (e.g. due to a depressed
property base resulting from a declining economy), increase in expenditures or capital
outlays above a sustainable level (if the city cannot actually afford to provide all their
services), or high debt burdens (where any revenues must be spent on servicing debt
i.e. paying interest). Following Wang et al. (2007), financial solvency (which is
comprised of cash, budget, long-run and service-level) is the focus as the financial
state measure. The focus here is not on developing a new measure of financial state,
but the impact it has on individuals living within a given community. Therefore, the
most agreed upon and widely accepted financial condition measures are used. Table
2 summarizes the financial indicators used to proxy for each of the four solvencies.
The multidimensional concept of the financial condition of a city permits a
more complete evaluation of cities financial condition. Even though all four solvency
measures are related to one another it is vital to explore each one of them. An
unfavorable value in the short-term does not necessarily imply that the municipality
is going to experience severe financial problems in the future, whereas a favorable
short-term solvency indicator, does not imply long-term financial stability.
Three ratios are used to proxy for Cash Solvency ;‘Debt-to-Cash’ (total debt
outstanding/total cash and securities), ‘STDebt-to-Cash’ (short-term debt at end-
of-year/total cash and securities), and ‘Revenue-to-STDebt’ (general revenue/short-
term debt at end-of-year). These ratios measure a city’s ability to cover its current
liabilities with its current assets. In general, a smaller value for the first two ratios
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and a larger value for the Revenue-to-STDebt can be understood as having a larger
cash solvency. A municipality with a large cash solvency would appear financially
more stable and therefore should have a positive impact on housing values.
The ‘Operating ratio’ (total revenues/total expenses), is used as a proxy for
Budget Solvency, which reflects a municipality’s ability to balance its budget by rais-
ing sufficient revenues to cover its expenses. While a high value indicates financial
stability, when solely looking at this ratio one has to be careful in interpreting the
reliability of it as a measure of financial stability. Most states in the U.S. require local
governments to balance their budgets, which means that many local governments will
have a favorable value for the operating ratio, but might actually experience financial
distress. Regardless of this issue, the ratio should have a positive impact on housing
value.
Two different ratios are constructed to measure a municipality’s Long-Run
Solvency. ‘LTLiability’ (total long-term debt outstanding/total interest on debt),
measuring a municipality’s indebtedness and ‘LTLiabilityperC’ (total long-term debt
outstanding/population). A higher value is associated with lower long-term solvency,
which means that the municipality experiences difficulties to meet its long-term obli-
gation. These obligations include current obligations, which arise annually, as well as
any obligations that only enter into the budget when they have to be paid, such as
new road building, future pension obligations, future debt payments etc.
Service-Level Solvency measures a city’s ability to continue to provide
the current level of service. Three indicators are constructed, ‘TperC’ (total
taxes/population), ‘RperC’ (total revenue/population) and ‘EperC’ (total expendi-
ture/population). Each of these measures relates to the amount of funds a city raises
and spends per resident, or how much of the revenues are raised by ‘burdening’ the
residents (through property taxes, income taxes etc). A high level of per capita taxes
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should be reflected in a lower housing value, while a high value of per capita revenue
should impact housing value in a positive way. Descriptive statistics of the financial
indicators are in Table 3.
4. The Statistical Model
Individuals consume “housing services”, which are determined by, or are a
function of, various attributes in a specific housing unit. Bundled together, these
attributes will be valued differently, not solely on an individual‘s preferences, but also
on the location. The location and the accompanying amenities will greatly influence
the valuation as well. Research has shown that a well-maintained neighborhood,
where neighbors are friendly and the overall feeling is communal would generally
be preferred to one where crime occurs and people are suspicious of those who live
nearby (Bishop et al. (2011)). Hence, it is necessary to look at each component
and its impact on the value individually. A hedonic pricing model permits taking a
variety of characteristics into consideration in order to estimate the marginal effects
these have on the value of a house.
A large number of research studies estimate the impact of housing character-
istics and various other factors, that contribute to the utility an individual gets from
housing consumption, and their impact on the value of housing. However, these hous-
ing and demographic characteristics are not the only factors that influence the value of
a house. Like compensating wage differentials, there will be compensating house price
differentials based on the locality one resides in. These compensating housing differ-
entials are based on a variety of factors, including the amenities provided by the city
or MSA. Another incentive that drives housing demand is school quality, where indi-
viduals are willing to pay higher housing prices in areas with higher school quality as
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noted by Bayer et al. (2004), Fack and Grenet (2010), and Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger
(2011). Other authors provide evidence that municipal competition, where municipal-
ities compete by providing larger quantity or better quality amenities, drives housing
prices (Hendershott and Thibodeau, 1990; Ozanne and Thibodeau, 1983). Thus, it is
likely that high levels of amenities such as green spaces, safe and vibrant downtowns,
quality roads, and competent public service staffs will lead to higher housing demand,
increasing the value of the houses in a given city.
However, the provision of public goods by cities is constrained (in some cases)
by balanced budget amendments, where cities must balance their budget based on
some time frame found in their local charter laws. Fiscal solvency is a measure for
the ability of a city to provide high levels of public goods to its citizens, which may
attract citizens from nearby, local cities. To capture the various effects, the hedonic
pricing model takes the form
ln(valuei) = α +Xiβ1 + Ziβ2 + Ciβ3 + FSiβ4 + vi, (1)
where ln(valuei) is the log of an owner’s self-reported housing value. The vector Xi
contains observable house characteristics, Zi contains observable demographic char-
acteristics, Ci contains city and MSA control variables, and FSi represents the fiscal
solvency of a city. A more detailed description of the variables used in the hedonic
pricing regression can be found in Table 4.
5. Estimation and Results
A variety of different city-level financial measures are implemented to capture
the impact of the financial state of cities on housing values. Analogous to the hedonic
48
price literature, controls for dwelling type and size, owner/renter demographics, and
community control variables are included, to capture the impact of these features on
housing prices. All regressions are estimated using state fixed effects and city-level
robust standard errors, Tables 5–8.
All models show that an increase in the number of rooms for a house, which in
combination with number of bedrooms serves as a proxy for the size of a house, leads
to an increase in the value of the unit. As expected, an increase in the number of
bedrooms in the housing unit increases the housing value across all specifications. A
1 bedroom increase in a house leads to a 6.7 percent increase in the value of a house.
The magnitude of this coefficient and its significance is constant across models. This
supports intuition and previous findings, as houses with more bedrooms also tend to
be larger in size. The magnitude for an increase in the value of the house caused
by an increase in the number of bedrooms is larger than that for an increase in the
number of rooms (6.7 percent compared to 3.5 percent). This finding holds for owner
occupied units as well as rented units. Table 8 column 2, shows the results for renter
occupied units. Here, an extra bedroom leads to an increase in rent by about 8.4%.
Intuitively, most apartments have a living room and a dining room, but differ in terms
of number of bedrooms and bathrooms, hence, the number of bedrooms has a larger
impact on rent than the number of rooms.
The impact of various demographic variables are similar across all models
(Tables 5–8). Increases in household income lead to increases in the value of a house.
This may come from a variety of factors. One is that homeowners, as their income
increases, may choose to improve or add features to their home that increase the
value of their home, such as a landscaped yard, a backyard patio, or even a garage.
A second is that as homeowners get more income, they often move to newer, larger,
and more expensive homes, a phenomenon that has been referred to as “keeping up
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with the Joneses”.
Similarly, the level of education by the head of household has a consistent and
significant impact on the value of a house. While it is hard to see how education
would have a direct effect on the value of housing, it can be argued that education
is proxying for some level of quality or wealth effect. On average, people with higher
levels of education have higher levels of income and over time are able to acquire
higher levels of wealth. Wealthier people are likely to demand different amenities
in their neighborhood and community, and are willing to contribute to them, for
example through maintenance on their home and property, then less wealthy people.
Owners with a bachelor degree live in more valuable homes, this result is likely due to
the fact that more highly educated households are paid more and can afford higher-
priced homes. Interestingly, Table 5, shows that not only an owner’s own education
matters, but the level of education in the ‘community’ as a whole. As the percentage of
people with a bachelor’s degree increases housing values increase as well. More highly
educated individuals are more likely to be able to afford luxury household services,
such as landscaping or maid services, which makes the home more visually appealing
from the outside. Similarly, since homeowners tend to move into neighborhoods with
individuals with similar characteristics, highly educated neighborhoods are also likely
to have higher housing values.
Literature on racial discrimination in housing markets has shown that pri-
marily black neighborhoods have lower housing values. The negative coefficient on
nblack, percentage of black households in a given Puma, supports these previous
findings. This result supports the argument for the existence of racial sorting, or
each race segmenting into a different and distinct part of the MSA, which can lead
to significantly lower housing values. A similar explanation is noted by Rhode and
Strumpf (2004). Another potential explanation is “white flight”, where whites may
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choose to leave a given area ones ‘blacks’ start to move in and relocate to the suburbs
(another city or another MSA), depressing home values. We find similar results when
using rent as the dependent variable; a 10 percent increase in the fraction of blacks
in a given PUMA leads to a 30% decrease in rent.
This study utilizes a wide variety of city financial measures to capture the
impact of the cities financial state on housing values. To show why it is important
to look at different financial ratios, capturing different types of solvency, instead of
relying only on a few, the hedonic regression is run separately using only ‘one type’
of solvency before including all measures in one regression.
Table 5 shows the regressions results including the financial ratios capturing a
city’s cash solvency and budget solvency. Column 1 shows that the debt− to− cash
ratio has no impact on the value of a house. The STdebt − to − Cash ratio, on
the other hand, has a significant and negative impact on the value of houses in a
city. The coefficient, in column 2 and 3, suggest that a 10-percent increase in this
ratio leads to a 3.2 to 3.3-percent decrease in the value of houses within that city.
Since short-term debt must be paid back quickly, increases in this ratio means that
the financial obligations, to pay back interest and principal, have increased. If cities
have no changes in their ability to pay back this debt, it is likely that they will
start reducing ”luxury” expenditures, such as improving city amenities, to pay down
the debt to meet their balanced budget amendments. This means less money spent
on neighborhood parks, city green spaces, and downtown clean-up efforts, until the
short-term debt has been reduced to a more manageable level. This result seems to
confirm the findings in Trussell and Patrick (2009). The authors noted that fiscally
distressed special districts had higher debt usage. Thus, the use of short-term debt
may be a proxy for a distressed city.
The results for the regressions including the financial ratios capturing service
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solvency are depicted in Table 6. Per capita revenues and per capita expenditures
do not significantly affect housing values within the city. However, an increase in per
capita taxes within a city leads to an increase in the value of houses within that city.
The coefficient on TperC, suggest that a 10 percent increase in per capita tax revenue
leads to a 7.8 percent increase in the value of a home. Column 5 shows the regression
results when all service solvency proxies are included. The point estimate of TperC
suggests an increase in housing value by about 9.5 percent a result of an increase
in per capita tax revenues of 10 percent, significant at .05. This may be due to a
variety of factors, if taxes within a city are higher, residents of that city may expect
a higher level of amenities being provided, affording them a more luxurious lifestyle.
These higher level amenities may attract more individuals into the city. Bayer et al.
(2004), Fack and Grenet (2010), and Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011) show that
better school quality funded by higher taxes increases housing values. Therefore, if
the higher taxes are used to improve school quality housing values may increase, as
more educated and wealthy individuals may choose to move into these areas. Another
plausible explanation is that cities may levy higher taxes on richer areas. When a
city levies higher property taxes on more prestigious areas, populated with more
high income individuals, higher housing values will lead to higher taxes, as local city
leaders realize that they can capture more rents from the populace, which will in turn
increase housing values.
A third explanation is that individuals within the city, and the city leaders,
levy higher taxes as a way to limit the amount of in-migration by lower income
individuals. Pollakowski and Wachter (1990) note that land-use regulations may be a
way to limit low-income individuals from moving into areas, by limiting the amount of
low-income housing that can be built. Taxes may be another barrier to entry for lower-
income individuals. All else equal, lower-income individuals are less able to pay high
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property taxes or local income taxes, and as such may hesitate to move to these areas,
even if they provide better quality (and higher quantity) amenities. Additionally, this
study finds an increase in the revenue to capital outlays ratio leads to a decrease in
the housing value, shown in Table 6 column 4. However, the decrease is very small,
a 100-percent increase in this ratio leads to a 0.3 percent decline in housing values
within a city. Though the effect is not large in level terms, it is significant at .1.
Many amenities provided by a city require significant capital outlays. New highways,
improvements to primary schools, fire departments, parks, and sidewalks are but
some of the services provided by a city that require these outlays. If revenues are not
being spent on these capital outlays, it is likely that they are being spent in other
ways that residents of the city may not agree with. For instance, a city may use
the increase in collected revenues to provide services that are targeted at a minority
of residents, which can drive the residents not impacted out of the area. Trussell
and Patrick (2009) note that special districts that have lower capital expenditures
are more likely to be fiscally distressed. In fact, they note that increasing capital
expenditures, relative to revenues and bond proceeds, by 10 percent lead to a 27.1
percent decrease in the odds of fiscal distress. If cities anticipate that they may not
be able to generate enough revenues in the future, they may halt capital expenditures
to provide for their budget shortfalls in the future. A lack of capital expenditures is
therefore a proxy for no ability to generate future revenues. If individuals in the city
witness this, they may choose to flee to neighboring cities or suburbs that may not
be as impacted, or that do provide the specific type of capital expenditures that they
desire.
Table 8, column 2 shows regression results where rent is used as the dependent
variable. Apartment rents decrease as the operatingratio increases. Apartment rents
also decrease as TperC increase. As total revenues to total expenditures increases
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(operatingratio), it is likely a sign of a booming economy. This may hint that indi-
viduals are substituting away from apartment living and towards purchasing houses,
leading to a decrease in the former and an increase in the latter. It is akin to an
income effect, where individuals utilize their higher incomes to purchase homes. The
fact that per capita tax revenue decrease apartment rents is likely the fact that per
capita taxes can be used as a barrier to entry for lower-income individuals (or anyone
that city residents deem undesirable). For instance, increasing local sales taxes may
push individuals who live in apartments to look for alternative locations to live.
6. Conclusions
A large portion of the finance literature has looked at potential causes leading
to fiscal distress of cities and many studies in the urban and housing literature have
investigated the impacts of various demographic and housing factors on the value
of housing. In recent years there has been an increase in concern over the financial
stability of cities and its effects, however, few studies have looked at the impact of
fiscal solvency of cities on the value of housing. It has been shown that people do not
choose their location of residence randomly, contrary, a lot of thought and considerable
searching goes into that decision. While employment plays an important role many
other factors have an influence on people’s decision as well. People not just care about
the characteristics of a housing unit, but also about their neighbors, the quality of
their immediate neighborhood, access to public transportation, school quality and
the amenities and services their community provides. Cities with high revenues are
able to use their revenues to finance amenities within the city that can attract new
residents and keep current residents in the area. Likewise, when cities have large
amounts of capital expenditures, it is likely that they are financing amenities that
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are desirable to certain segments of the population. However, if a city’s financial
situation becomes uncertain, it is likely that there will be decreases in the level of
services provided or increases in taxes. Both scenarios are likely to be perceived as a
disamenity to residents and negatively impact the demand for housing in such a city
and with that may lead to a decrease in housing values.
Utilizing very detailed financial information on 175 cities, numerous financial
condition measures are constructed proxying for four types of cities financial solvency.
A hedonic housing price regression is estimated to measure the effect of these financial
measures on the value of housing within a city. The results suggest that cities financial
activities have a significant effect on housing values, where less financially stable cities
experience a decrease in housing value compared to cities that appear to be financially
stable. It is vital to focus on different solvency measures, since a city that appears
to be financially stable in the short-run might experience problems in the long-run,
while cities that appear to have financial shortages in the short-run, might actually
be stable in the long-run. Additionally, cities with a high per capita revenue level
may appear financially healthy, but if these revenues are not spend on services that
their residents desire housing values may be impacted negatively.
While the results suggest that there is a negative effect of long-term solvency
on housing values this effect is not statistically significant. This could be due to
residents not fully knowing, or understanding the financial long-term obligation of
their respective community. Short-term solvency has a negative impact on housing
values as well, where an increase of 10 percent in stdebt − to − cash will lead to
decrease in housing value of 2.3 percent. Intuitively, if a city can not cover its short-
term obligations with its ‘cash on hands’, people might observe an immediate change
in service level. Interestingly, housing values increase by 0.7 percent as the per capita
tax revenue of a city increases by 10 percent. The increase in tax revenues does
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not have to come from an increase in property taxes, but could be a result of an
increase in tax revenues from businesses operating in the city, potentially attracting
more people. Additionally, if these taxes are used to fund public goods that are in
larger quantity or higher quality it will attract citizens from different areas, further
increasing the effect of a booming economy on the demand for housing, and leading
to higher housing values.
The results support the notion that city-level fiscal solvency is an important
determinant in housing prices, measured by a number of different indicators. This
research can be extended by implementing a richer model exploring the individual
substitutability between apartment rents and housing prices, as individuals search for
city-level amenities that fit their preferred specifications. Also, it would be interesting
to explore city-level efficiency of revenue and expenditure streams in providing a













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Ratios
Financial Ratio Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STDebt-to-Cash 68,882 0.0233 0.0829 0.0000 0.7759
Debt-to-Cash 68,882 0.9899 0.1064 0.6556 1.4383
Operating Ratio 68,882 0.9899 0.1064 0.6556 1.4383
LTLiability 68,882 25.7930 8.4993 12.0867 78.2553
LTLiabilityperC 68,882 5.8993 4.1562 0.0984 16.8461
Debt-to-Revenue 68,882 1.4138 0.7217 0.1439 5.6842
TperC 68,882 1.6159 1.5668 0.2342 8.5498
EperC 68,882 4.8121 3.9256 0.6389 20.0939
RperC 68,882 4.7241 3.6867 0.6839 17.6360
Revenue-to-CapOutlay 68,882 7.3652 6.7715 1.7426 64.3478
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Table 2.4: Name and Description of Variables
Variable Name Description
Dependent Variable
value self-reported owner-estimated market value of unit
Unit Characteristics and Selected Costs
rooms Number of rooms in unit
bedrooms Number of bedrooms
builtyr2 Age of structure, decade
structure Indicator if unit is a single-family detached unit
propinsr Annual property insurance cost
owncost Selected monthly owner costs (includes all utilities etc.)
hhincome Total household income (annual)
Owner Demographics
male Indicator if head of household is male
age Age of household head married
Indicator if household type is ‘married’
black Indicator if household head is black
educ household head’s years of schooling
educHS Indicator if household head holds a HS degree
educBD Indicator if household head holds a Bachelor’s degree
‘Community’ Control Variables
nvalueh PUMA-level average housing value
nblack PUMA-level fraction of population who is black
neducHS PUMA level fraction of population with HS degree
neducBD PUMA level fraction of population with Bachelor’s degree
Economic Control Variables
unemployment rate MSA-level unemployment rate (2011)
nincome MSA-level per capita income (2011)
population change MSA-level percentage change in population from previous year (2011)
Geography
state State (FIPS code) the unit is located in
metro indicator if unit is located in city center
MSA Metropolitan area unit is located in
city City the unit is located in
citypop City population
puma Public Use Microdata Area (geographic area of 100,000 inhabitants)
Financial Variables
total revenue City’s total revenue (FYD 2010)
total taxes City’s total taxes collected (FYD 2010)
total expenditure City’s total expenditure (FYD 2010)
total capital outlay City’s total expenditure on capital (FYD 2010)
totalinterestondebt City’s total interest payments on debt for FYD 2010
totaldebtout City’s total debt outstanding (long=term and short-term)
stdebtendofyear City’s short-term debt (due within one year)
totallongtermdebt City’s long-term debt outstanding (due in more than one year)
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Table 2.5: Cash Solvency and Budget Solvency Regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Housing and Household Characteristics
rooms 0.0348*** 0.0349*** 0.0349*** 0.0348***
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
bedrooms 0.0675*** 0.0675*** 0.0674*** 0.0674***
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075)
owncost 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
hhincome 8.43E-07*** 8.41E-07*** 8.41E-07*** 8.43E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Community Controls
educBD 0.1040*** 0.1040*** 0.1040*** 0.1040***
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
nceducBD 0.6770*** 0.5980*** 0.6050*** 0.6720***
(0.1950) (0.1900) (0.1910) (0.1940)
ncblack −0.5050*** −0.5370*** −0.5320*** −0.5090***
(0.1060) (0.1030) (0.1050) (0.1080)
nvalueh 1.08E-06*** 1.07E-06*** 1.07E-06*** 1.08E-06***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
population 7.11E-05*** 6.91E-05*** 6.93E-05*** 7.16E-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
populationpercentchange −0.0024 −0.0039 −0.0039 −0.0024
(0.0271) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0268)
percapitapersonalincome 9.07E-06*** 9.75E-06*** 9.71E-06*** 9.24e-06***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
unemploymentrate 1.6000 1.6660 1.6790 1.6520








Observations 30,727 30,727 30,727 30,727
R-squared 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.599
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Significant at 1% level ***, 5% level **, 10% level *
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Table 2.6: Service Solvency Regression
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Housing and Household Characteristics
rooms 0.0350*** 0.0349*** 0.0349*** 0.0347*** 0.0349***
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
bedrooms 0.0679*** 0.0676*** 0.0676*** 0.0673*** 0.0677***
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0075)
owncost 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Community Characteristics
hhincome 8.51E-07*** 8.47E-07*** 8.48E-07*** 8.44E-07*** 8.49E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
educBD 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
nbeducBD 0.533*** 0.629*** 0.618*** 0.678*** 0.568***
(0.1830) (0.1970) (0.1950) (0.1900) (0.1890)
ncblack −0.505*** −0.522*** −0.528*** −0.507*** −0.480***
(0.0979) (0.1060) (0.1080) (0.1050) (0.0965)
nvalueh 1.04E-06*** 1.06E-06*** 1.06E-06*** 1.07E-06*** 1.04E-06***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
population 5.42E-05*** 6.69E-05*** 6.57E-05*** 6.93E-05*** 5.50E-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
populationpercentchange −0.0215 −0.0072 −0.0085 −0.0069 −0.0228
(0.0247) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0262) (0.0246)
percapitapersonalincome 5.38E-06* 8.82E-06*** 8.87E-06*** 9.31E-06*** 5.04E-06*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
unemploymentrate 0.6170 1.6300 1.6590 1.5390 0.2920










Observations 30,727 30,727 30,727 30,727 30,727
R-squared 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.599
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Significant at 1% level ***, 5% level **, 10% level *
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Table 2.7: Long-Run Solvency Regression
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Housing and Household Characteristics
rooms 0.0348*** 0.0348*** 0.0348*** 0.0348***
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
bedrooms 0.0677*** 0.0675*** 0.0675*** 0.0678***
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075)
owncost 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Community Characteristics
hhincome 8.44E-07*** 8.44E-07*** 8.43E-07*** 8.49E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
educBD 0.1040*** 0.1040*** 0.1040*** 0.1040***
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
nceducBD 0.674*** 0.672*** 0.676*** 0.659***
(0.1940) (0.1940) (0.1950) (0.1910)
ncblack −0.495*** −0.512*** −0.506*** −0.510***
(0.1050) (0.1100) (0.1060) (0.1090)
nvalueh 1.07E-06*** 1.07E-06*** 1.08E-06*** 1.06E-06***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
population 7.19E-05*** 6.95E-05*** 7.11E-05*** 6.74E-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
populationpercentchange −0.0030 −0.0043 −0.0023 −0.0094
(0.0274) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0286)
percapitapersonalincome 9.27E-06*** 8.92E-06*** 9.04E-06*** 8.87E-06***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
unemploymentrate 1.5220 1.6400 1.5980 1.5950








Observations 30,727 30,727 30,727 30,727
R-squared 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.599
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Significant at 1% level ***, 5% level **, 10% level *
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Table 2.8: City Financial State Impact on Housing Value and Rent
Model 14 Model 15





































Robust standard errors in parentheses
Significant at 1% level ***, 5% level **, 10% level *
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